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Abstract 
The capacity to identify cheaters is essential for maintaining balanced social relationships, yet 
humans have been shown to be generally poor deception detectors.  In fact, a plethora of 
empirical findings holds that individuals are only slightly better than chance when discerning 
lies from truths.  Here we report five experiments showing that judges’ ability to detect 
deception greatly increases after periods of unconscious processing.  Specifically, judges who 
were kept from consciously deliberating outperformed judges who were encouraged to do so, 
or who made a decision immediately; moreover, unconscious thinkers’ detection accuracy 
was significantly above chance level.  The reported experiments further show that this 
improvement comes about because unconscious thinking processes allow for integrating the 
particularly rich information basis necessary for accurate lie detection.  These findings 
suggest that the human mind is not unfit to distinguish between truth and deception, but that 
this ability resides in previously overlooked processes. 
Keywords: lie detection, detection of deception, unconscious processes, decision 
making, judgment 
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Unconscious Processes Improve Lie Detection 
Although telling the truth is generally considered a virtue, lying appears to be a 
phenomenon of everyday life.  For instance, college students and members of a community 
college reported lying to their romantic partners in 34% of all social interactions (DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998).  Similarly unsettling, 81% of participants admitted to telling at least one lie in 
the course of a job interview, with a mean amount of 2.19 lies (cf. Weiss & Feldman, 2006).  
Detecting such deception is vital for both individuals and society (Ekman, 1992).  This is 
perhaps best illustrated in the legal context, where the veracity judgments of police officers 
and legal professionals often have serious consequences on both the individual and societal 
level (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). 
Despite the importance of lie detection for human and societal prosperity, recent 
reviews and meta-analyses suggest that individuals achieve, overall, an accuracy rate only 
slightly above chance level when judging the veracity of true or invented statements (e.g., 
54%, Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij, 2008), and that humans are better 
equipped to identify truths as non-deceptive than they are at detecting lies as deceptive (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006).  Moreover, to date, few individual or situational variables are known to 
consistently improve people’s ability to detect deception (for an overview, see Granhag & 
Stromwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008).  For example, meta-analytic evidence suggests that experts 
(e.g., police officers) are not better able to detect deception than were laypersons (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008; see O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004, as well as 
Frank & Ekman, 1997; for specific contexts in which expertise may help).  Relatedly, Aamodt 
and Custer (2006) found no significant relationship between detection accuracy and 
education, sex, age, or confidence. 
These findings suggest that the human mind is unfit to distinguish between truth and 
deception, despite the vital importance of being able to do so.  The present contribution seeks 
to challenge this perspective by proposing that lie detection may be poor when individuals 
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES IMPROVE LIE DETECTION 4 
consciously focus on discerning truth and lies, but can be substantially improved when 
individuals delegate lie detection to less conscious processes.  Specifically, we designed five 
experiments to test the hypothesis that lie detection can be significantly improved above 
chance level when individuals are distracted from thinking consciously.  In what follows, we 
delineate why this performance boost may be expected by drawing on the literature of lie 
detection and unconscious processes.  We start by reviewing four reasons discussed in the 
literature for why lie detection performance is generally poor and then discuss, in a second 
step, why unconscious processes may help to overcome three of these constraints. 
Four Reasons for Poor Lie Detection Accuracy 
The lie detection literature is replete with findings documenting lie detection 
performance as being only slightly above chance level (for recent reviews, see Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij, 2008). Below we review four reasons often put 
forward when trying to explain this evidence.  
Few diagnostic cues.  Although researchers have developed a number of theories to 
explain why people may behave differently when they are lying as opposed to when they are 
telling the truth (e.g. Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 1992; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969; Sporer, 2004; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 2000; Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985), only a few cues such as 
detailedness or plausibility of the message, spontaneous corrections, or admitted lack of 
memory have been found to be reliably correlated with deception (see DePaulo et al., 2003).  
Based on a recent meta-analysis, Hartwig and Bond (2011) argue that this shortage of valid 
objective cues does not allow for high accuracy rates.  We believe a less radical perspective is 
in order, assuming that the shortage of valid cues increases the importance of the “right 
circumstances,” but does not render substantial increases in accuracy rate over chance level to 
be impossible. In line with this argument, Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-analysis revealed 
a number of moderators that influence accuracy rates in deception detection, such as a focus 
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on paraverbal and content cues (in audiovisual presentations, audio presentations, or 
transcripts) compared to visual cues (in video only presentations). Moreover, recent research 
has shown that judges holding more accurate beliefs about cues to deception achieved higher 
accuracy in classifying true and deceptive messages  (Forrest, Feldman, & Tyler, 2004; 
Reinhard, Scharmach, & Müller, 2013).  
Lack of conscious processing capacity.  A second explanation holds that integrating 
veracity cues into an overall judgment is a complex endeavour—perhaps too complex given 
the constraints imposed on conscious thinking.  At least two considerations are important 
here. First, with respect to the cues themselves, Reinhard and Sporer (2008, 2010) suggested 
that not all deception cues are processed easily, but that cues used in credibility judgments 
vary with respect to the cognitive demands they place on judges. Some of the cues that judges 
might use to infer credibility are easily processed; for example, a judge’s overall impression 
of the sender’s nervousness or gaze aversion.  Other cues, such as detailedness or plausibility, 
are cognitively more demanding because their assessment requires more scrutiny, and 
therefore more processing capacity in the course of lie detection (see Forrest & Feldman, 
2000; Reinhard, Scharmach, & Stahlberg, in press; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008).  Second, it has 
been argued that using a high number of possible cues should result in higher accuracy of 
classifying true and deceptive accounts (see Granhag & Strömvall, 2004; Vrij, 2008).  
Forming judgments based on more than one cue, however, is more demanding cognitively.  
Reinhard and Sporer (2008), for instance, showed that the processing of both verbal content 
information and nonverbal information is cognitively more demanding than the processing of 
nonverbal information alone.  Their participants used both verbal and nonverbal indicators of 
deception for their credibility judgments under conditions of sufficient task involvement 
(Experiment 1) and when cognitive capacity was not limited (Experiments 2 & 3).  In 
contrast, under low task involvement and high cognitive load, respectively, participants used 
nonverbal information for their credibility attributions only.  Together, these considerations 
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suggest that forming veracity judgments is likely to be a complex endeavor requiring 
appropriate cognitive resources.  Given serious constraints on the human capacity to 
consciously handle several pieces of information (Miller, 1956), this complexity may 
constitute a significant hurdle. 
Using the wrong cues.  A third reason for low accuracy rates in lie detection may be 
that people inadvertently use the wrong cues when evaluating veracity because they hold false 
beliefs about cue validities.  This argument receives support from a series of studies 
investigating laypeople’s beliefs about deception (e.g., Akehurst, Koehnken, Vrij, & Bull, 
1996; Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Reinhard, Burghardt, Sporer, & Bursch, 2002; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2003).  Akehurst and colleagues (1996), for example, observed that 
laypeople associate deception with an increase in nervous facial expressions, gaze aversion, 
self-manipulating behaviors, hand and leg movements, and with an overall nervous bodily 
expression (for conceptually similar evidence, see Breuer, Sporer, & Reinhard, 2005; Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006).  Further research has shown that such beliefs are highly 
correlated with judgments of veracity, suggesting that individuals strongly draw on their naïve 
theories when trying to discern lies from the truth (e.g., Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli, 1985; 
Reinhard et al., 2002).  Yet, only a few of these cues are objectively related to deceptive 
behavior; in fact, most of these cues are not diagnostic about truth status and thus are 
misleading (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 2008).  For 
example, in their meta-analysis on actual deception cues, DePaulo and colleagues (2003) 
found no evidence that liars avoid eye contact to a higher degree than truth tellers.  Also, liars 
were not found to be more active in their body, hand, arm, or foot movements than were truth 
tellers.  Recent studies even observed less hand and finger movements for liars than for truth 
tellers (Vrij, 2008; see also Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).  Together, these findings suggest that 
individuals hold false beliefs about cue validities, and are led astray when relying on these 
false beliefs in veracity judgments.  In line with this argument, Levine and colleagues (2011) 
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recently reported that cues that guide attributed believability are independent from actual cues 
of deception. 
Top-down processing.  A fourth explanation can be derived from research arguing that 
people often rely on top-down processing routines when forming veracity judgments, such as 
judgmental rules of thumb and stereotypes.  For example, O’Sullivan (2003) investigated the 
influence of the fundamental attribution error in deception judgments.  She demonstrated that 
specific veracity judgments are highly correlated with lay judges’ trait judgments of the 
communicator’s trustworthiness.  O’Sullivan (2003) argued that global cues often guide the 
search and use of specific cues in veracity judgments.  Similarly pointing to top-down 
processing, Reinhard and Sporer (2010) found that judges strongly use the attractiveness of a 
source as a heuristic cue when judging the credibility of a statement (“If she is attractive, she 
must be honest.” see also Aune, Levine, Ching, & Yoshimoto, 1993).  Other researchers 
found that people with facial deformities were rated as less credible (Bull, 1979) and people 
with a baby-faced appearance were rated as more credible (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2003, 
2004).  Likewise, individuals tend to commit the truth bias, the visual bias, the demeanor bias, 
and the expectancy violation bias when forming veracity judgments (see Burgoon, Blair, & 
Strom, 2008).  Together, these findings suggest that individuals tend to rely on top-down 
processing routines when evaluating truth and deception.  To the extent that this top-down 
processing produces bias, accuracy in deception detection should be hampered. 
Unconscious Processes May Increase Lie Detection Performance 
The four reasons reviewed above offer a rather pessimistic picture with respect to the 
human capacity for discerning lies from the truth (see Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & 
Bond, 2011).  Yet we believe there is reason to be more optimistic.  This belief is fueled by 
our impression that the dominant setting in lie detection research is one of “conscious” 
thinking (see also Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009; DePaulo, Rosenthal, Rieder Green, 
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& Rosenkrantz, 1982).  Specifically, individuals are generally asked to consciously deliberate 
about whether another person has lied or told the truth.  What if the deficiencies generally 
documented in lie detection research are specific to this thinking mode, which is known to be 
severely limited (e.g., Miller, 1956)?  Here we suggest that more accurate lie detection 
performance is likely in circumstances that are less fraught with the limitations imposed on 
conscious thinking.  More specifically, we propose that unconscious thinking processes 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004) may help to form more accurate lie/truth judgments.  To second this 
argument, in what follows, we review recent research on the merits of unconscious thought.  
The last 40 years have brought about evidence that processes outside conscious 
awareness may fundamentally influence perception, thinking, and behavior (for a recent 
review, see Bargh, 2011).  One of the latest developments in this research tradition is 
Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT, Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), which holds that 
judgments and decisions may be formed in the absence of conscious awareness.  UTT 
fundamentally distinguishes between two modes of thought:  Conscious thinking (CT) is 
defined as decision-relevant processes that occur when individuals focus on the decisional 
target, whereas unconscious thinking (UT) is defined as decision-relevant processes that occur 
when individuals’ conscious attention is directed elsewhere; that is, not on the decision.  The 
two modes of thinking differ on a series of characteristics, of which those relevant in the 
present context are reviewed in what follows.  Before doing so, we note that the merits of 
unconscious thought have not been undisputed and continue to be the subject of a lively and 
sometimes heated debate in the literature (e.g., Acker, 2008; Gonzalez-Vallejo, Lassiter, 
Bellezza, & Lindberg, 2008; Lassiter, Lindberg, Gonzalez-Vallejo, Bellezza, & Phillips, 
2009; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009; but see also Bargh, 
2011; Strick et al., 2011; Strick, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2010). 
Conscious versus unconscious processing capacity.  One of the key differences 
between conscious and unconscious thinking pertains to processing capacity.  Whereas 
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conscious thinking capacity is generally believed to be severely constrained (e.g., Miller, 
1956, the magic number 7), unconscious processes are assumed to have far greater processing 
capacity (e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006).  As a consequence, unconscious thought should outperform conscious 
thought when decision-making problems are complex.  In support of this hypothesis, 
Dijksterhuis (2004) observed that unconscious thinkers showed superior decision performance 
when the information basis was particularly rich (see also Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van 
Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). Similarly, Messner and Wänke (2011) 
reported that choices after periods of unconscious thinking led to higher satisfaction in large 
assortments, again suggesting that unconscious thought offers the necessary capacity to deal 
with particularly rich information sets.  Finally, in a series of contributions, Ham and van den 
Bos (2010a, 2010b) observed that periods of unconscious thought resulted in more accurate 
justice and guilt judgments (compared to an accepted expert standard), as well as more 
utilitarian moral judgments (Ham, van den Bos, and van Doorn, 2009).  Again, these changes 
were traced back to unconscious thought’s greater capacity, which presumably allowed for 
dealing with the particularly rich and complex information basis necessary when forming 
justice, guilt, and moral judgments. 
Using cues.  Conscious and unconscious thinking are conceptualized as different with 
respect to the weighing of information cues (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  Conscious 
thought, on the one hand, is believed to be poor with respect to the weighing of information 
cues (see also Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  For instance, Wilson and 
colleagues (1993) observed that compared to decisions formed immediately, conscious 
deliberation resulted in less satisfying choices.  Presumably this was because conscious 
thinking led individuals to focus on decision cues that are verbalizable but not focal with 
respect to subsequent choice satisfaction, thus interfering with critical nonreportable processes 
(for conceptually related evidence in the realm of insight problem solving, see Schooler, 
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Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993).  This “misleading” may be a function of undue salience in the 
decision context (for the critical role of the situation, e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), but also 
of false beliefs about what will likely be a satisfying choice (e.g., see the literature on 
affective forecasting; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  Unconscious thought, on the other hand, has 
been argued to be better at weighing information cues (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  This 
may be because it is less influenced by situational forces and consciously held naïve beliefs, 
but weighs cues more on the basis of ecological learning experiences and associatively 
represented network structures. 
Top-down versus bottom-up processing.  Finally, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) 
have suggested that whereas conscious thought works primarily top-down, unconscious 
thought works bottom-up.  Bos and Dijksterhuis (2011), for instance, report evidence 
collected in a classic impression formation tasks.  Both judgmental data and memory 
parameters suggest that conscious thinkers relied on a misleading stereotype whereas the 
judgments of unconscious thinkers were unbiased.  Presumably this occurred because 
conscious thinkers processed information top-down, whereas unconscious thinkers worked 
bottom-up.  Relatedly, Messner, Wänke, and Weibel (2011) reported that personnel selection 
decisions after periods of unconscious thought were free of gender and attractiveness biases, 
whereas conscious thinkers fell prey to these misleading heuristics.  Supposedly this is 
because unconscious thinkers integrate the available information bottom-up, whereas 
conscious thinkers work top-down and are therefore misled when stereotypes do not carry 
truth value.  
Though not specified in UTT, a precondition for bottom-up processing to yield 
unbiased results would appear to be an unbiased information basis. Indeed, if encoding is 
biased, decisions are likely biased, too. We therefore suggest that unconscious thought should 
work best when information encoding occurs unbiased. Because specific decision goals often 
cue specific stereotypes or schemas (e.g., Goal: Select a manager. Stereotype: Think manager, 
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think male. Schein, 1973), it would seem commendable to provide the goal to form a decision 
only after encoding is completed. We adhered to this reasoning in designing the experiments 
reported in what follows. 
When comparing these three characteristics of unconscious thought as defined in UTT 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) with the reasons for poor lie detection reviewed above, at 
least two conclusions ensue: First, what is said to have resulted in poor lie detection 
performance in existing research—lack of conscious processing capacity, using the wrong 
cues, top-down processing—is symptomatic for conscious but not unconscious thinking.  
Second, periods of unconscious thought may be expected to allow for higher accuracy rates 
because unconscious thought (a) disposes one of the capacity necessary to integrate the 
particularly rich information necessary for accurate lie detection, (b) may be expected to be 
uninfluenced by consciously held yet not necessarily correct beliefs about cues to deception, 
and (c) should integrate the available information bottom-up instead of process the 
information with top-down stereotypes.  As a consequence, compared to consciously formed 
decisions, periods of unconscious thought may be expected to allow for increases in detection 
accuracy.  Moreover, lie/truth decisions promoted by periods of unconscious thought should 
reflect the integration of more, and more objectively accurate, pieces of information.  The 
experiments reported herein will formally test these considerations.  In line with general 
practice in lie detection research, participants in all experiments are asked to form veracity 
judgments about stimulus persons who either lied or told the truth (e.g., Ask, Greifeneder, & 
Reinhard, 2012; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & Marksteiner, 2011; 
Vrij, 2008).  In addition, relying on experimental procedures from research on unconscious 
processes (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004), we varied whether veracity judgments were formed 
directly after watching the messages, after short periods of “conscious thought,” or after short 
periods of “unconscious thought.”  We expect that veracity judgments formed after a short 
period of unconscious thought are significantly more accurate compared to veracity 
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judgments formed directly after watching the messages or after a short period of conscious 
thought. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design.  Sixty-six university students (36 women; Mage = 22.94 
years) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: standard control versus conscious-
thought versus unconscious-thought. 
Stimulus materials.  Eight male students of economic sciences (age 22–29) posed as 
stimulus persons.  The students were asked to recount in front of a digital video camera 
(a) their most recent internship and (b) one fictitious, randomly assigned internship.  The 
order of internships (actual or fictitious) was counterbalanced.  The stimulus persons 
participated in exchange for 15 Euros, with the possibility of gaining up to 15 Euros 
additionally if they told believable stories.  Stimulus persons were seated behind a table; the 
recordings showed their upper bodies and part of the table; the interviewer was off camera.  
The stimulus persons had been asked to appear in business attire and care was taken that the 
room looked appropriate for an employment interview setting.  Stimulus persons were given 
five minutes to prepare before recording.  For this preparation they were provided with three 
questions (“When, where, and for whom did you do your internship?”, “What exactly did you 
do in the internship?”, and “What did you like/dislike about the internship?”) and were asked 
to base their story on these questions.  The resulting 16 accounts were detailed and 
comprehensive (M = 228s, SD = 37.43); average message length did not differ between true 
(M = 224s, SD = 31.89) and deceptive messages (M = 233s, SD = 44.02), t(14) = 0.47, p = 
.65.  We created two sets of recordings with eight accounts each, whereby each stimulus 
person was featured only once.  Each of the two sets contained four truthful and four 
deceptive accounts.  
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Procedure.  We introduced the experiment as “an experiment about interpersonal 
impression formation.” No further information was given at this point. Participants watched 
eight video recordings (in predetermined random order; identical for all participants).  The 
recordings did not include any hints as to the possibility of deception.  Following general 
practice in lie detection research, standard control participants were told that some of the 
applicants were lying and were explicitly asked to evaluate the truthfulness of each recording.  
Specifically, participants learned that some stimulus persons will be telling the truth in that 
they will report on a real internship they actually did, whereas other stimulus persons will be 
telling a lie, in that they will report on a fictitious internship. However, participants were not 
informed about how many applicants were lying or telling the truth. Moreover, before 
watching the recordings, we informed participants that they will be later asked to tell which 
stimulus persons told the truth, and which were lying.  After each recording, standard control 
participants judged the truthfulness of the applicant’s story (true vs. false).   
Materials and proceeding were identical for unconscious-thought and conscious-
thought participants, except for the following three variations.  First, in contrast to standard 
control participants, conscious-thought and unconscious-thought participants were informed 
about the possibility of deception only after having watched the recordings, but watched the 
recordings with the simple instruction to form an impression of what they saw and heard.  We 
introduced this change because we did not want information encoding for conscious-thought 
and unconscious-thought participants to be influenced by a judgment goal, so as to isolate the 
effects of thinking mode.  Although justified from a theoretical perspective, this change 
created a confound between thinking mode and time of information presentation (conscious-
thought and unconscious-thought vs. standard control), which we will further address in 
Experiment 3.  Second, having watched all recordings and having been made aware of the 
possibility of deception, unconscious-thought participants were informed that they will be 
later asked to tell which stimulus persons told the truth, and which were lying. Unconscious-
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thought participants then worked on a taxing non–word-search puzzle for three minutes (see 
Bos, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2008).  Specifically, in a matrix of 15 × 15 letters, we asked 
unconscious-thought participants to find as many previously indicated five- to eight-letter 
non-words as possible.  This task was to direct participants’ conscious awareness away from 
the video recordings, thereby creating conditions of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006).  Instead of working on the non–word-search puzzle, conscious-thought participants 
were given three minutes to actively deliberate over which of the stimulus persons had lied 
and which had told the truth.  Finally, conscious-thought and unconscious-thought 
participants were handed a questionnaire including pictures of each of the eight applicants and 
were asked to indicate which applicants had lied versus told the truth.  At the end of the 
experiment, participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked for participating. 
Results 
Classification accuracies (in %) for all, true, and deceptive messages across all 
thinking mode conditions are displayed in Table 1.  With a mean value of 54.73% (SD = 
19.42), classification accuracy was—overall—significantly above chance (50%), t(65) = 2.20, 
p = .032. 
We used signal detection analysis for hypothesis testing (e.g., Stanislaw & Todorov, 
1999; Swets, Dawes, and Monahan, 2000). Signal detection analysis generally yields two 
parameter estimates, discrimination ability d’ (d prime; here a measure of the ability to detect 
truths/lies) and response bias C (Criterion; here a measure of true/false response tendencies, 
often referred to as judgmental or truth bias).  
d’ was subjected to a 3 (thinking mode: standard control vs. conscious-thought vs. 
unconscious-thought) × 2 (gender: male vs. female) factorial ANOVA.1 In line with our 
hypothesis, the effect of thinking mode on d’ was significant, F(2, 60) = 4.06, p = .022, ηp2 = 
.12 (see Figure 1).  Planned contrast analyses further revealed that participants in the 
unconscious-thought condition were significantly better in detecting deception (Munconscious-
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thought = .63, SD = 0.99) than participants in the standard control condition (Mstandard control = .02, 
SD = 0.75), F(1, 60) = 5.40, p = .023, d = 0.69, and participants in the conscious-thought 
condition (Mconscious-thought = .10, SD = 0.79), F(1, 60) = 4.28, p = .043, d = 0.60.  Further, 
participants in the standard control condition and participants in the conscious-thought 
condition did not significantly differ in detection accuracy, F(1, 60) = 0.10, p = .76.  Gender 
of participants and the interaction of thinking mode with gender had no significant effects on 
d’, all ps > .28. 
In the present research, there were no ex ante reasons to expect that the three thought 
conditions would differently affect C, judgmental bias.  Nevertheless, to offer a complete 
picture, C was subjected to the same ANOVA as described above.  No significant effect for C 
was obtained, F(2, 60) = 1.44, p = .244, ηp2 = .05 (Mstandard control = -.09, SD = 0.44 vs. 
Mconscious-thought = .13, SD = 0.31 vs. Munconscious-thought = -.08, SD = 0.35), indicating that the 
manipulation of thinking mode did not significantly influence participants’ judgmental bias. 
Moreover, gender and the interaction of thinking mode with gender had no significant effects 
on C, all Fs < 1.2 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 confirmed the hypothesis that lie/truth judgments 
formed after short periods of unconscious thought were significantly more accurate than 
judgments formed right after watching the message (standard control) or after periods of 
conscious thought.  Presumably this is because unconscious thought helps to overcome some 
of the constraints posed on conscious thinking modes, such as low processing capacity, which 
may hamper the integration of many different and complex cues (Granhag & Strömvall, 2004; 
Vrij, 2008). 
Experiment 2 
The results reported in Experiment 1 are noteworthy in several respects, perhaps most 
importantly because prior research consistently sustained the conclusion that lie detection 
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accuracy is generally only slightly better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & 
Bond, 2011).  In contrast to this almost general rule, periods of unconscious processing 
resulted in a remarkable accuracy advantage both over chance and over the other two thinking 
modes.  Against this background, it appeared desirable to replicate the reported pattern of 
results with a different set of materials in a different type of domain (see Miller & Stiff, 1993; 
as well as Vrij, 2008, for the importance of replications in lie detection research).  We 
designed Experiment 2 to fulfill this goal, by employing the same experimental design, yet a 
new and quite different set of recordings; namely, interviews about personal attitudes.  We 
expected to replicate the pattern observed in Experiment 1; that is, lie/truth judgments formed 
after a short period of unconscious thought are significantly more accurate compared to 
veracity judgments formed directly after watching the messages or after a short period of 
conscious thought. 
Method 
Participants and design.  A total of 116 students of the University of Mannheim (62 
women; Mage =22.84 years) participated in exchange for six Euros in an experiment lasting 15 
minutes.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; standard control, 
conscious-thought, and unconscious-thought. 
Stimulus materials and procedure.  Stimulus materials featured 32 students lying or 
telling the truth about their attitude toward a movie or TV series (for more details, see 
Reinhard, 2010).  In the truth condition, participants were asked to take about one minute to 
describe a movie they really liked or disliked.  The participants in the deception condition 
were asked to describe a movie they actually liked (disliked) as though they really disliked 
(liked) it.  All participants were instructed to appear as truthful as possible, and told that they 
could receive an extra reward of five Euros if the interviewer who was blind to the 
experimental conditions believed that they indeed liked or disliked the movie (for more 
details, see Reinhard, 2010).  Asking individuals to describe objects or other people they 
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like/dislike in a truthful or deceptive way is a common method for creating true or deceptive 
messages about personal attitudes, and it was used, for example, by DePaulo and colleagues 
(1982), DePaulo and Rosenthal (1979), and Frank and Ekman (1997).  For all recordings, the 
camera was positioned about three meters away from the chair on which the participant was 
seated, such that participants’ head and upper body could be seen. Recordings lasted about 30 
seconds; average message length did not differ significantly between true (M = 29.69s, SD = 
4.49) and deceptive messages (M = 28.98s, SD = 3.64), t < 1.   
We created four video sets each containing eight recordings.  Each participant watched 
one set of eight video recordings in predetermined random order (identical for all 
participants).  The recordings did not include any hints as to the possibility of deception. 
Results 
Classification accuracies (in %) for all, true, and deceptive messages across all 
thinking mode conditions are displayed in Table 1.  Overall, the percentage of correct lie–
truth classifications was M = 57.00% (SD = 20.41), which is significantly above chance level, 
t(115) = 3.70, p < .001. 
In line with our hypothesis, the effect of thinking mode on d’ was significant, F(2, 
110) = 6.10, p = .003 (see Figure 2).  Planned contrast analyses further revealed that 
participants in the unconscious-thought condition were significantly better in detecting 
deception (Munconscious-thought = .64, SD = 0.89) than participants in the standard control 
condition (Mstandard control = .07, SD = 0.76), F(1, 110) = 9.31, p = .003, d = 0.69, and 
participants in the conscious-thought condition (Mconscious-thought = .16, SD = 0.83), F(1, 110) = 
6.28, p = .014, d = 0.56.  As expected, participants in the standard control condition and 
participants in the conscious-thought condition did not significantly differ in detection 
accuracy, F(1, 60) = 0.23, p = .63.  Gender and the interaction of thinking mode with gender 
had no significant effects on d’, all ps > .28. 
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Again, the effect of thinking mode on C (criterion; a measure of judgmental bias) was 
not significant, F(2, 110) = 0.68, p = .51, ηp2 = .012 (Mstandard control = .33, SD = 0.38 vs. 
Mconscious-thought = .36, SD = 0.33 vs. Munconscious-thought = .26, SD = 0.29), indicating that the 
manipulation of thinking mode did not significantly influence participants’ judgmental bias. 
Unexpectedly, a marginally significant main effect of gender on C was observed, F(1, 110) = 
3.30, p = .073, ηp2 = .029 (Mfemales = .37, SD = 0.34 vs. Mmales = .26, SD = 0.33), suggesting 
that female compared to male participants tended to judge more recordings as true, 
independent of objective truth status. The interaction of thinking mode with gender on C was 
not significant, F(2, 110) = 1.57, p = .21.3 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicates the results observed in Experiment 1 with different stimulus 
materials.  Both experiments suggest that detection accuracy is superior after periods of 
unconscious thought.  That similar findings were obtained with different sets of materials 
strongly attests to the generality of the observed pattern of results and strongly increases 
confidence in the reported evidence.   
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 offered a clear pattern of results indicating that unconscious-
thought participants formed more accurate veracity judgments than both conscious-thought 
and standard control participants.  Although the comparison of unconscious-thought and 
conscious-thought is methodologically sound, one could argue that these groups cannot be 
directly compared to the standard control participants due to a methodological confound.  
Specifically, for conceptual reasons, the time at which participants learned about the 
possibility of deception varied between the standard control versus conscious-thought and 
unconscious-thought groups.  In the standard control group, it appeared desirable to inform 
participants about the possibility of deception before showing the recordings, so as to connect 
the present findings with existing research on lie detection (which generally offers this 
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information first).  In the conscious-thought and unconscious-thought groups, however, our 
primary concern was to avoid differences in encoding so as to isolate the effects of processing 
that we are interested in.  We therefore opted to present information about the possibility of 
deception only after the recordings were shown.  As a consequence of these choices, there is a 
small possibility that accuracy differences between standard control and unconscious-thought 
participants need not stem from differences in thinking mode, as argued above.  To address 
this concern, we added a new condition in Experiment 3 in which participants formed veracity 
judgments immediately after having seen the recordings (just like standard control 
participants), but without knowing about the possibility of deception beforehand (just like 
unconscious-thought and conscious-thought participants).  We predicted that this new control 
condition (immediate) will show results similar to that of standard control and conscious-
thought participants.4 
A second methodological issue captured our attention: One could argue that upon 
seeing a specific recording, participants in the standard control condition did not directly form 
a judgment, but pondered the issue for some moments.  By way of this, standard control 
participants might have taken advantage of conscious or even unconscious processing, too.  
This argument might explain why standard control participants performed similarly poorly 
than conscious-thought participants, but cannot explain why their performance is in sharp 
contrast to the performance of unconscious-thought participants. Nevertheless, to address this 
issue, we decided to include yet another control group.  Specifically, in one condition 
henceforth labeled “online,” participants were asked to judge veracity directly and 
spontaneously after each recording. 
Finally, to further increase confidence in the observed findings and their 
generalizability, we employed a different set of materials in Experiment 3; namely, videos 
about deceptive or truthful alibi reports.  Irrespective of this change in material, we expected 
to replicate the pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2, and more specifically hypothesized 
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that lie/truth judgments formed after a short period of unconscious thought are significantly 
more accurate compared to veracity judgments formed in all other conditions. 
Method 
Participants and design.  A total of 120 students of the University of Applied 
Sciences Ludwigshafen (59 women; Mage = 23.83 years) participated in exchange for five 
Euros in an experiment lasting 20 minutes.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
five conditions: standard control vs. online vs. immediate vs. conscious-thought vs. 
unconscious-thought. 
Stimulus materials and procedure.  The material used in this study was created by 
Reinhard et al. (2012).  Twenty male students from the University of Mannheim participated 
in a study with the possibility of earning up to 30 Euros.  The procedure was adapted from 
Vrij, Mann, Kirsten, and Fisher (2007), and differed for truth versus lie recordings.   
For truth recordings, participants were guided to an initial experimental room in 
which a table had been prepared with a Backgammon board, the appropriate amount of 
tokens, and two dices.  In this room, participants met a “game partner,” who was introduced 
as another participant, but in fact was a confederate.  It was ensured that all participants were 
knowledgeable at playing Backgammon beforehand. 
After entering the room, participants signed a consent form and sat down at the table 
with the confederate.  The experimenter told the participants to start playing and then left the 
room.  The confederate had been instructed to keep the topics of conversation constant by 
evading any topics other than participants’ experience with Backgammon, the rules of the 
game, and participants’ field of study. 
While playing, participants were interrupted three times.  First, the experimenter 
entered the room to ask if everything was okay and to let down the window shutter.  Second, 
the confederate interrupted the game to answer an apparently important phone call, leaving 
the room for approximately one minute.  The third interruption happened when a second 
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confederate entered the room to look for her wallet.  Upon finding her wallet, she claimed that 
the cash contents (20 Euros) were missing.  She then asked the two players if they had seen 
anybody touching her bag or wallet; all negated. 
At this point, participants were asked to go to another room where they would be 
interviewed about the missing money.  They received 10 Euros for their participation up to 
this point, and were told they could earn another 20 Euros if they could successfully convince 
the interviewer that they had not stolen the money.  This rather substantial reward was chosen 
to address the issue of sufficient stakes for stimulus persons raised in the literature (Frank & 
Ekman, 1997; Vrij, 2008). 
For lie recordings, participants did not play Backgammon.  Instead, they entered a 
room, received 10 Euros, and were asked to take 20 Euros from a wallet and to hide the 
money somewhere on their person.  They were then told that they would go to a different 
room later where they would be interviewed about the missing money, and were instructed to 
deny having taken the money.  They were also provided with an alibi about what had 
happened in that room and could take as much time as they needed in order to familiarize 
themselves with the alibi.  Here is what they read: 
You participated in a psychological study.  You entered the room and your game 
partner was already sitting at a table, which had a Backgammon board, tokens, and 
two dices on it.  The experimenter asked you to start playing and then left the room.  
You played Backgammon with your game partner, and while playing, you talked 
about the rules, your experience with Backgammon, and your field of study.  After a 
couple of minutes, the experimenter entered the room, asked if everything was okay, 
let down the shutters, and left again.  After a couple more minutes, your game 
partner’s cell phone rang and he left the room for about a minute to take the call.  You 
remained at the table and waited for him.  Then he returned to his place and you 
continued playing.  Suddenly a woman entered to get her bag which she had forgotten 
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in the room after the experiment.  The bag was lying by the wall behind your game 
partner’s seat.  The woman looked in her wallet and noticed that 20 Euros were 
missing.  She asked you both whether you had seen anybody touching her bag and 
wallet.  You both negated.  Up to that point, the entire game had lasted approximately 
10 minutes. 
Participants were allowed to alter the alibi to some extent, if necessary, in order to 
appear as trustworthy as possible.  In sum, participants in the lie condition had the same 
information about the Backgammon game as participants in the truth condition, without 
actually having engaged in the activities they were going to present in their alibi.  Moreover, 
unlike participants in the truth condition, they in fact had taken 20 Euros from the wallet. 
Participants in both conditions were then asked to enter the adjacent room where yet 
another confederate posed as the interviewer.  The interviewer asked all participants the same 
questions, beginning with: “You are suspected of having taken 20 Euros from this woman’s 
wallet.  Have you taken the money from the wallet?”  Further questions were: “What have 
you been doing the entire time in the first room?”; “Did anybody else enter the room while 
you were playing?”; “Please tell me about the game of Backgammon you were playing”; “I 
have noticed that your game partner left the room to take a call.  What did you do in the room 
while he was outside?”; “… So you would have had the opportunity to take the money while 
your game partner was outside?” 
After the recording, all participants were given the additional 20 Euros or were told 
they could keep the money they were hiding on their body, respectively, and were fully 
debriefed. 
Length of recordings did not differ significantly as a function of truth status (Mtruth = 
147.6 s, SD = 27.9; Mlie = 142.9 s, SD = 26.3), F(1, 18) = 0.15, p = .70, r = .08.  The videos 
were divided into five sets with four videos each, both containing two true and two deceptive 
statements.  Each participant watched one set of four video recordings in predetermined 
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random order (identical for all participants). The recordings did not include any hints as to the 
possibility of deception. 
Procedure.  Procedures for standard control, unconscious-thought, and conscious-
thought participants were parallel to those in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants in the online 
condition were treated identically as in the standard control condition, but were instructed to 
form a veracity judgment directly and spontaneously after having watched each video.  
Parallel to the conscious-thought and unconscious-thought condition, participants in the 
immediate condition watched the recordings with the simple instruction to form an impression 
of what they saw and heard.  Only after having watched all recordings and having been made 
aware of the possibility of deception were participants in the immediate condition asked to 
indicate which person had lied versus told the truth.  At the end of the experiment, we 
debriefed, paid, and thanked all participants. 
Results 
Classification accuracies (in %) for all, true, and deceptive messages depending on 
thinking mode conditions are displayed in Table 1.  Overall, the percentage of correct lie–
truth classifications was M = 50.83% (SD = 31.91), which is not significantly above chance 
level, t(119) = 0.29, p = .78. 
Classification accuracy measure d’ was subjected to a 5 (thinking mode: standard 
control vs. conscious-thought vs. unconscious-thought vs. immediate vs. online) × 2 (gender: 
male vs. female) ANOVA.  In line with our hypothesis, the effect of thinking mode on d’ was 
significant, F(4, 110) = 4.76, p = .001 (see Figure 3).  As expected, planned contrast analyses 
found that unconscious-thought participants were significantly better in detecting deception 
(Munconscious-thought = .52, SD = 0.65) than standard control participants (Mstandard control = -.12, SD 
= 0.44), F(1, 110) = 12.10, p = .001, d = 1.16, conscious-thought participants (Mconscious-thought 
= -.10, SD = 0.64), F(1, 110) = 11.35, p = .001, d = 0.96, participants in the online condition 
(Monline = -.22, SD = 0.77), F(1, 110) = 16.04, p < .001, d = 1.04, and participants in the 
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immediate condition (Mimmediate = .07, SD = 0.67), F(1, 110) = 6.05, p = .015, d = 0.66.  
Moreover, participants in the standard control condition, conscious-thought condition, online 
condition, and immediate condition did not significantly differ from each other in detection 
accuracy, all ps = .12. Gender of participants and the interaction of thinking mode with gender 
had no significant effects on d’, all ps > .25. Finally, as before, the effect of thinking mode on 
C (criterion; a measure of judgmental bias) was not significant, F(4, 110) = 1.99, p = .10, ηp2 
= .068 (Mstandard control = .39, SD = 0.24 vs. Mconscious-thought = .37, SD = 0.20 vs. Munconscious-thought 
= .26, SD = 0.18 vs. Monline = .27, SD = 0.20 vs. Mimmediate = .34, SD = 0.19).  Likewise, the 
main effect of gender and the interaction of thinking mode with gender on C were not 
significant, F < 1.5 
Discussion 
Replicating Experiments 1 and 2 with yet a different set of materials, Experiment 3 
found clear support that classification accuracy for true and deceptive messages is superior 
after periods of unconscious thought, thus attesting to the findings’ generalizability.  In 
addition, Experiment 3 was designed to address methodological issues inherent in the design 
of Experiments 1 and 2.  Specifically, for conceptual reasons outlined above, the standard 
control condition differs from the unconscious-thought and conscious-thought conditions in 
the timing of when participants learn about the possibility of deception, thus creating a 
potentially problematic confound.  To address this concern, a new control group was added in 
Experiment 3 (labeled immediate).  A second methodological concern pertained to the 
possibility that standard control participants might have taken advantage of unconscious 
processing by shortly pondering the issue before forming their judgment.  Though being 
directly refuted by the results reported in Experiments 1 and 2, it nevertheless appeared 
commendable to address this issue formally by adding still another control group (labeled 
online).  Of importance, detection accuracy of both the immediate and the online condition (a) 
was significantly lower than unconscious-thought participants’ detection accuracy, and (b) did 
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not significantly differ from detection accuracy in both the standard control and the 
conscious-thought condition.  This pattern of results casts strong doubt about the 
methodological concerns raised above, and suggests that both standard control and conscious-
thought are suitable comparison conditions for evaluating the performance of unconscious-
thought participants; in Experiments 4 and 5, we will therefore again focus on these 
experimental conditions. 
Going beyond the context of lie detection, the results of Experiment 3 allow for 
addressing a debate recently raised in the literature on unconscious thought.  Specifically, 
Lassiter and colleagues (2009) contended that unconscious thought is an artefact and best 
explained in terms of a judgment formed online directly upon being asked to form an 
impression; supposedly, it is this online judgment that unconscious thinkers recall following 
the distraction period.  The various control groups assessed in the present experiment, 
especially the immediate and online conditions, cannot be reconciled with this position, but 
strongly suggest that unconscious thinking is more than recalling a previously formed online-
judgment. This conclusion conceptually dovetails with evidence reported by Strick and 
colleagues (2010), who observed that online judgments are not predictive of offline judgments 
in conditions of unconscious thought.   
It is interesting to note that the materials employed in Experiment 3 (mock crime 
scenarios) might have elicited some suspicion about the messages’ truth status in 
unconscious-thought participants even during message presentation. This might have created 
an implicit “detection goal,” rendering Experiment 3 different from Experiments 1 and 2, in 
which unconscious-thought participants’ likely started to wonder about truth status only when 
prompted about this possibility, that is, after message presentation. Although providing the 
decision goal only after information presentation appears commendable from a theoretical 
perspective (see bottom-up principle), unconscious-thought participants performed similarly 
well in the three experiments. Interestingly, this parallels evidence obtained in earlier 
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES IMPROVE LIE DETECTION 26 
research, in which unconscious-thought participants did well regardless of whether the 
decision goal was provided before information presentation (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Messner 
et al., 2011) or only after the information encoding stage (e.g., Bos et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis et 
al., 2006). To our knowledge, these inconsistencies in procedure in particular, and the 
encoding stage in general, have not been considered in theorizing on UTT. This appears 
noteworthy as an unbiased information basis would appear to be a critical precondition for 
unbiased (bottom-up) decision making. How, then, can we explain that the timing of decision 
goal provision proved irrelevant in unconscious-thought studies so far? One way is to assume 
that in existing unconscious thought experiments, stereotypes or decision goals did not affect 
information interpretation; put differently, we need to assume that stereotypes did not bias the 
information as such. With this assumption in place, the presence of stereotypes or decision 
goals during information encoding may not hinder, but even help unconscious thought to do 
well. First, in all of the above reviewed experiments, participants are asked to form an 
impression of the information, thus considering all the information given. Second, schema-
inconsistent information is encoded more deeply (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979). Third, 
schema-inconsistent information is likely considered when individuals try to form complete 
and integrated impressions (as in bottom-up processing), but not when individuals try to form 
coherent impressions (as in top-down processing, see Stangor and McMillan, 1992). To the 
extent that schema-inconsistent information is particularly conducive to form good decisions 
(as, for instance, in Messner et al., 2011), stereotype-induced differences in encoding are 
hence to the advantage of those processing unconsciously.  
Interestingly, although schema-inconsistent information is encoded more deeply, this 
encoding advantage fades over time (e.g., Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Because unconscious 
thought experiments usually last no longer than 60 minutes (certainly not several days), 
previous work might have benefitted from the deeper encoding of schema-inconsistent 
information without succumbing to the problem of trace decay. From this perspective, future 
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research may fruitfully incorporate a time-perspective in unconscious thought experiments, 
exploring, for instance, whether the finding that unconscious thought participants form less 
stereotypical judgments (e.g., Bos & Dijksterhuis, 2011; Messner et al., 2011) vanishes with 
longer time intervals. To conclude, from a theoretical perspective, unbiased information 
encoding appears commendable for later unbiased judgments. However, when the impact of 
stereotypes is limited to the how of encoding (and does not bias what is encoded), the 
processing advantages tied to schema-inconsistent information may even help unconscious 
thought to do well, at least in the short run. Very cautiously, one may conclude from this 
evidence that the benefit of unconscious thought may also be found in applied settings where 
judges often have some reason to be suspicious when first encoding the relevant information.  
Experiment 4 
In the previous experiments, we chose the labels “conscious thought” and 
“unconscious thought” so as to connect the present findings with the existing terminology in 
the literature (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). There is likely little debate about the label “conscious 
thought,” because it closely reflects what participants are asked to do—after having been 
given the goal to discern lies from truths, participants are asked to consciously deliberate. In 
contrast, it has been argued that the conditions we labeled as “unconscious thought” might be 
better referred to as “distraction,” since after having been given the goal to discern lies from 
truths, participants were not told to think unconsciously, but were distracted from conscious 
goal-directed deliberation. On the level of operationalization, “distraction” would thus appear 
to be the more appropriate label. However, against the background of the existing literature, 
the label “unconscious thought” appears more appropriate conceptually.  
On a more general level, these alternatives in labeling—unconscious thought versus 
distraction—reflect an ongoing discussion about the nature of unconscious thought. On the 
one hand, Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006) have purported and empirically substantiated that what happens during the distraction 
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period is an active thinking process that results, for instance, in a more polarized perspective 
on decision alternatives. Moreover, recent fMRI research suggests that during unconscious 
thought, neural activity other than that of the distractor task can be observed (Creswell, 
Bursley, & Satpute, in press). On the other hand, one could argue that the distraction period 
merely offers the bliss to forget irrelevant or non-diagnostic information. For instance, in lie 
detection, a period of distraction may render highly salient but non-diagnostic cues less 
accessible, thereby reducing individuals’ tendency to focus on the wrong ones (see also the 
notion of “set-shifting” or “fresh look” in creativity research, e.g., Schooler & Melcher, 
1995). Similarly, one could argue that what remains after the distraction period is the gist and 
not the details of the watched recordings. To the extent that the gist reflects more of the 
diagnostic cues and less of the non-diagnostic ones, relying on the gist after the distraction 
period could increase judgment accuracy.6 From this alternative perspective, the increase in 
detection accuracy during the distraction period is not due to an active unconscious thinking 
process as purported by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006), but to benedictory forgetting.  
To our knowledge, two sets of findings have addressed these competing hypotheses 
(Bos,  Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2008; Zhong, Dijksterhuis, & Galinsky, 2008). In both sets 
of evidence, the authors introduced a new condition labeled “mere-distraction” that relied on 
the same distraction manipulation than the unconscious-thought condition. Unlike the 
unconscious-thought condition, however, participants in the mere-distraction condition 
learned about the processing goal only after the distraction period. If mere-distraction 
participants do as well as unconscious-thought participants, one may conclude that what 
happens during the conditions labeled as unconscious-thought may not be different from 
forgetting. However, if unconscious-thought participants do better than mere-distraction 
participants, one may conclude that what happens during unconscious thought is different 
from forgetting. In both sets of findings, unconscious-thought participants outperformed 
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mere-distraction participants, suggesting that there is more to the conditions labeled 
unconscious thought than the mere bliss of a “fresh look” or forgetting.  
Although previous evidence on mere-distraction is available in the literature, it 
appeared desirable to rule out the possibility of mere-distraction in the present context of lie 
detection. Perhaps the most important reason is that by refuting a highly intuitive and 
prominent alternative account, further (albeit indirect) evidence is accrued for the tenet that it 
is active unconscious thinking processes that increases lie detection accuracy. For this reason, 
we extended Experiment 2 by adding a mere-distraction condition. 
Method 
Participants and design.  A total of 83 students of the University of Mannheim (38 
women; Mage =22.06 years) participated in exchange for 5 Euros in an experiment lasting 15 
minutes.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions; standard control, 
conscious-thought, unconscious-thought, and mere-distraction. 
Stimulus materials and procedure.  We reemployed the materials from Experiment 
2: that is, true and deceptive messages about stimulus persons’ attitudes toward a movie or 
TV series. Four video sets each containing eight recordings were used.  Each participant 
watched one set of eight video recordings in a predetermined random order (identical for all 
participants).  The recordings did not include any hints as to the possibility of deception.  
Procedures for standard control, unconscious-thought, and conscious-thought 
participants were parallel to Experiment 1 to 3. For the mere-distraction condition, we 
followed the proceeding introduced by Bos and colleagues (2008, Experiments 1a and 1b): 
after watching the recordings, mere-distraction participants were told that this part of the 
experiment is now over. Unlike the unconscious-thought condition, mere-distraction 
participants then directly worked on the distractor task without being informed about the 
possibility of deception or the goal to discern lies from truths (this information was provided 
only after the distractor task). 
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Results 
Classification accuracies (in %) for all, true, and deceptive messages across all 
thinking mode conditions are displayed in Table 1.  Overall, the percentage of correct lie–
truth classifications was M = 53.62% (SD = 18.88), which is not significantly above chance 
level, t(82) = 1.74, p = .085. 
The classification accuracy measure d’ was subjected to a 4 (thinking mode: standard 
control vs. conscious-thought vs. unconscious-thought vs. mere-distraction) × 2 (gender: male 
vs. female) ANOVA. In line with our hypothesis, the effect of thinking mode on d’ was 
significant, F(3, 75) = 4.04, p = .010 (see Figure 4).  Planned contrast analyses further 
revealed that participants in the unconscious-thought condition were significantly better in 
detecting deception (Munconscious-thought = .62, SD = 0.96) than participants in the standard 
control condition (Mstandard control = .08, SD = 0.56), F(1, 75) = 5.75, p = .019, d = 0.70, 
participants in the conscious-thought condition (Mconscious-thought = -.16, SD = 0.68), F(1, 75) = 
11.74, p = .001, d = 0.94, and participants in the mere-distraction condition (Mmere-distraction = 
.12, SD = 0.72), F(1, 75) = 4.15, p = .045, d = 0.58.  As expected, participants in the standard 
control condition, participants in the conscious-thought condition, and participants in the 
mere-distraction condition did not significantly differ from each other in detection accuracy, 
all ps > .24.  Gender, and the interaction of thinking mode with gender, had no significant 
effects on d’, all Fs < .1. 
Again, the effect of thinking mode on C (criterion; a measure of judgmental bias) was not 
significant, F(3, 75) = 1.55, p = .21, (Mstandard control = .40, SD = 0.29 vs. Mconscious-thought = .35, 
SD = 0.26 vs. Munconscious-thought = .21, SD = 0.27 vs. Mmere-distraction = .39, SD = 0.27), indicating 
that the manipulation of thinking mode did not significantly influence participants’ 
judgmental bias. The main effect of gender, and the interaction of thinking mode with gender, 
on C, were not significant, all ps > .20. 
Discussion 
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Experiment 4 was designed to test whether the high levels of detection accuracy 
observed in the conditions labeled as unconscious-thought in Experiments 1 to 3 can be 
alternatively explained by blissful forgetting. To this end we added a new condition labeled 
mere-distraction, which was identical to the previous unconscious-thought conditions, apart 
from providing the decision-goal only after the distraction period. If mere-distraction 
participants had done as equally well as unconscious-thought participants, one could have 
concluded that similar processes go on in both conditions, such as blissful forgetting. 
However, unconscious-thought participants were significantly better than mere-distraction 
participants in discerning lies from truth, suggesting that different processes underlie the 
effects observed in the conditions of unconscious-thought versus mere-distraction. It should 
be noted, however, that the evidence reported herein does not itself demonstrate that 
unconscious thought is taking place; it is only evidence for the occurrence of some process 
other than what happens during mere distraction. At a minimum, therefore, labeling the 
unconscious-thought conditions as “distraction” would be inappropriate. So as to connect the 
present findings with the literature, and in taking note of recent findings by Creswell and 
colleagues (in press), it appears justified, at present, to retain the label “unconscious-thought.” 
Experiment 5 
Experiments 1 to 4 consistently demonstrate the superior lie detection performance of 
participants after periods of unconscious thought.  What has remained open so far, however, is 
how such superior performance can be explained.  Experiment 5 is to add this critical piece of 
evidence by focusing on the underlying processes.  To reiterate, poor detection performance is 
generally traced back to a lack of conscious processing capacity, to using the wrong cues, and 
to top-down processing on the basis of stereotypes (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008).  
Although these processing deficiencies are symptomatic for conscious processing 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), unconscious thought presumably disposes of the necessary 
capacity to integrate a large number of complex cues, more appropriately weighs cues 
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according to their objective validities, and integrates information from the bottom up.  
Experiment 5 aims to test these assertions by analyzing which information cues unconscious-
thought participants—in contrast to standard control and conscious-thought participants—rely 
on.  Specifically, it is hypothesized that unconscious processes may allow for integrating more 
information in a less stereotypically biased manner.  To the extent that integrating many 
pieces of information increases reliability, and that less reliance on stereotypical, salient, or 
easily verbalized information cues increases validity (see also Schooler et al., 1993; Wilson et 
al., 1993), conditions of unconscious thought should result in superior performance compared 
to judgments formed immediately or after periods of conscious thought.  We tested these 
considerations by (a) coding recordings with respect to a total of 27 nonverbal, paraverbal, 
and verbal cues, (b) establishing which cues are diagnostic for deception detection (cue 
validities), and (c) determining how many and which cues correlate with participants’ 
judgments in the standard control, conscious-thought, and unconscious-thought conditions, as 
an indication of information use. 
Method 
Participants and design.  A total of 216 university students (95 women; Mage = 23.88 
years) participated in exchange for 1 Euro.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: standard control, conscious-thought, and unconscious-thought. 
Materials.  We employed a set of 72 video recordings more fully described in 
Reinhard (2010).  All recordings were transcribed according to specified transcription rules, 
which included codes for unfilled and filled pauses, sentence breaks, slips of the tongue, 
incomplete words, incomplete sentences, and grammar errors.  We then asked independent 
coders to rate the occurrence of a total of 27 objective verbal, paraverbal, and nonverbal cues 
(see Table 2), identified in previous research either as objective (DePaulo et al, 2003; Ekman, 
1992; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 2008) or as believed cues of deception (Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  The ratings of verbal and 
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paraverbal content cues were directly based on the transcripts.  Paraverbal cues in the 
transcripts were counted with a word processor separately for each transcript.  For the 
frequency counts of nonverbal deception cues, the video recordings were muted in order for 
raters not to be distracted by the verbal content. 
Procedure.  Procedures were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2, except that 
each participant judged only one video recording (see Reinhard et al., 2012).  Moreover, the 
time for conscious thought and unconscious thought was restricted to two minutes.  Again, 
participants were asked to evaluate truthfulness. 
Results 
Classification accuracy. Because participants judged only one video, we analyzed the 
number of participants who correctly classified their recording as lie or truth with logistic 
regression.  Specifically, the number of participants who correctly classified their message 
was entered as the dependent variable, and thinking mode, gender of participants, and the 
interaction of the two variables as independent variables.  Only a main effect of thinking 
mode emerged, Wald = 11.75, p = .001.  As expected, more participants in the unconscious-
thought condition (77.8%) classified their message correctly than in the conscious-thought 
(45.8%) and the standard control (48.6%) conditions, indicating that only in the unconscious-
thought condition did more participants classify the message correctly than would be expected 
by chance.  Moreover, the correlation between truth status and lie/truth judgment was 
significant for participants in the unconscious-thought condition, r(72) = .59, p < .001, but not 
in the conscious-thought , r(72) = -.08, p = .49 and standard control condition, r(72) = -.03, p 
= .80.  We also included participants’ response (lie vs. truth) as a control variable in the above 
described logistic regression to preclude that the effects of thinking mode on classification 
accuracy are driven by a higher number of participants judging their message as true or 
deceptive in one of the conditions.  As expected, however, the main effect of thinking mode 
remained highly significant, Wald = 12.92, p < .001. 
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Actual use of verbal content, nonverbal, and paraverbal cues in veracity 
judgments.  We first established which information cues were objectively diagnostic for 
detecting deception by calculating the difference in mean frequency of cue occurrence for true 
versus deceptive messages separately for every cue.  Results are expressed as effect sizes (d) 
in Table 2, column 6; larger values indicate more frequent cue occurrence in true messages.  
In line with recent meta-analayses (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007), we 
found, for instance, that truth tellers referred more often to their mental status, showed less 
postural shifts, and more facial pleasantness.  Moreover, in our messages, truth tellers showed 
less vocal tension and used shorter filled and unfilled pauses as well as less word and phrase 
repetitions.  
Next we separately correlated cue frequencies with participants’ lie/truth judgments 
for the three thinking modes (Table 2, columns 2 to 4).  In the unconscious-thought condition, 
5 out of 27 possible correlations were significant.  Specifically, unconscious-thought 
participants were more likely to judge their message as true when the stimulus person 
objectively showed less posture shifts, more facial pleasantness, and more fidgeting 
(nonverbal cues), as well as when the message was presented with less vocal tension and 
shorter unfilled pauses (paraverbal cues).  Importantly, four out of five of the employed cues 
were objectively diagnostic for deception detection in our messages. In contrast, for standard 
control participants, only two cues (eye contact and involved/expressive) were significantly 
correlated with lie/truth judgments.  Note that neither of these cues proved to be a diagnostic 
cue for differentiating lies from truth in our recordings (see cue validities, column 6), which 
parallels earlier findings suggesting that, for instance, eye contact is a salient cue that is 
stereotypically (but not actually) associated with lying (see Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  
Similarly, for conscious-thought participants, only two cues (consistency and attractiveness) 
were significantly correlated with lie/truth judgments.  Again, both cues were not diagnostic 
for differentiating between true versus deceptive recordings, which parallels earlier evidence 
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(see Vrij, 2008).  In sum, compared to the standard control and conscious-thought conditions, 
a statistically higher number of statistically significant (and diagnostically relevant) 
correlations were observed in the unconscious-thought condition (binomial test, p < .003). 
To further corroborate the hypothesis that decisions reflect stronger reliance on 
objective cues in conditions of unconscious-thought compared to conscious-thought and 
standard control, we applied a method used by Hartwig and Bond (2011). We first converted 
objective cue validities (objective rpbs, Table 2, column 5) to Fisher’s Zrs. Second, separately 
for the three experimental conditions, we converted the correlations between cue frequencies 
and participants’ lie/truth judgments (henceforth referred to as judgment cues, Table 2, 
columns 2 to 4) to Fisher’s Zrs.  In analyses across cues (not participants), we then correlated 
the Zrs for actual deception cues with the Zrs for judgment cues, again separately for the three 
experimental conditions. These analyses resulted in three cross-cue Pearson’s rs, which reflect 
the relation between objectively valid deception cues and cue use in judgments within the 
three thinking conditions. As expected, for the unconscious-thought condition, the relation is 
positive and highly significant, pointing to a strong tendency to rely on objectively valid cues 
(r = .79, p < .001). In contrast, for the standard control and conscious-thought, the correlations 
failed to reach conventional levels of significance, (r = -.27, p = .18 and r = .09, p = .66, 
respectively).  Also as expected, the relation of objectively valid deception cues to judgment 
cues in the unconscious-thought condition was significantly different from those in the 
standard control and conscious-thought condition (all ps < .001; no significant difference 
between standard control and conscious-thought, p = .11).  These results strongly suggest that 
unconscious-thought participants relied on more objectively accurate cues, whereas standard 
control and conscious-thought participants’ decisions reflect the use of misleading cues. 
Discussion 
Experiment 5 replicated the primary finding that unconscious-thought participants 
more successfully detect lies from the truth.  More importantly, by coding information cues, 
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES IMPROVE LIE DETECTION 36 
establishing cue validities, and determining how many and which cues participants actually 
relied on, we observed that unconscious-thought participants used both a higher number of 
and more diagnostic cues than standard control or conscious-thought participants for detecting 
deception.  Experiment 5 thus supplies a critical piece of evidence and allows for 
understanding how the superior performance of unconscious-thought participants comes 
about.  
We suggest that the high correlation between objectively valid deception cues and cue 
use in judgments in the unconscious-thought condition reflects reliance on more diagnostic 
cues. Interestingly, one could also argue that this high correlation may be traced back to a 
third variable: accuracy. This is because covariance between the messages’ actual truth status 
and objective cues implies, to some extent, correlation between objective cues and subjective 
judgments when detection accuracy is high (i.e., high correlation between actual truth status 
and subjective judgments). As a result, it is possible that the high correlation between 
objectively valid deception cues and cue use in the unconscious-thought condition does not 
reflect reliance on the cues we identified as diagnostic, but to other variables influencing 
accuracy, such as other valid cues not coded in our messages. Thus, the present analyses do 
not allow for conclusively deciding about which specific cues helped unconscious-thought 
participants to achieve high accuracy rates. However, because accuracy is generally 
determined by the extent of reliance on valid or invalid cues (see Hartwig & Bond, 2011), we 
would argue that the method of Study 5 is a promising approach to investigate the process of 
unconscious processes in deception detection. Further research using the method of Study 5 
(coding a specific number of objective cues) and also studies using simulated interviews in 
which specific cues are manipulated experimentally (e.g., Stiff et al., 1989, Reinhard & 
Sporer, 2008) may help to further elucidate the question of which cues judges in a 
unconscious-thought condition rely on.  
UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES IMPROVE LIE DETECTION 37 
General Discussion 
Previous research in the field of deception detection has observed that individuals 
without any special training are often no better than chance at detecting lies from truth (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006; Ekman, 1992; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  This poor performance was related 
to a set of reasons, including a relative scarcity of diagnostic cues (see DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Hartwig & Bond, 2011), limitations in conscious processing capacity when integrating 
complex and many cues (e.g., Miller, 1956), tendencies to rely on false lay beliefs about what 
convicts liars (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996), and reliance on misleading top-down processing 
routines (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2003).  Overcoming at least some of these constraints should 
increase accuracy in lie detection.  In line with this reasoning, and building on recent evidence 
on the merit of unconscious processes in decision making (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), we 
hypothesized that lie detection accuracy may be significantly increased when individuals 
think unconsciously; that is, rely on “cognitive and/or affective task-relevant processes that 
take place outside conscious awareness” (Dijksterhuis, 2004, p. 586).  This hypothesis draws 
on a series of principles characterizing unconscious thought, most notably that unconscious 
compared to conscious thought supposedly has greater processing capacity, succumbs less to 
weighing deficiencies, and works bottom-up, thus falling prey less easily to misleading top-
down processing (see Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  These characteristics may allow 
unconscious thought to overcome the constraints previously identified as causing poor lie 
detection performance.  Against this background, we tested whether short periods of 
unconscious processing allow for detection accuracy superior to both conscious thought and 
chance level.  A set of five experiments yielded unanimous support for this hypothesis. 
The superior detection performance of unconscious thought was hypothesized to 
emerge from the capacity to deal with the particularly rich and complex information basis 
necessary for accurate lie detection, thus allowing for integrating more, and more diagnostic 
pieces of information.  In support of this conceptual argument, we observed that unconscious-
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thought participants relied on more information cues than standard control or conscious-
thought participants.  To the extent that relying on more cues increases reliability, judgments 
of unconscious-thought participants should be more accurate by virtue of statistical principles, 
even if each of the employed cues carries some error component.  In addition, we observed 
that unconscious-thought participants relied on more diagnostic information cues, again 
contributing to better performance when telling lies from the truth.  Specifically, we observed 
that standard control and conscious-thought participants relied relatively more on salient and 
stereotypical cues (which are not necessarily valid, see DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 
2011; Reinhard et al., 2011), whereas judgments of unconscious-thought participants were 
less biased in these respects, but reflected the use of more objective cues.     
It is worth highlighting that the effect sizes for the influence of unconscious thinking 
on classification accuracy were higher than those in many studies in social psychology in 
general, and in the area of detecting deception in particular (see Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Messner, 2010).  In fact, the effect sizes reported here are near to 
those observed when judges use specific interview techniques developed to detect deception 
(Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010; for overviews, see Vrij, 2008; Vrij, & Granhag, 2012). For 
example, Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, and Kronkvist (2006) developed a specific interview 
technique called Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE).  In SUE, interviewers learn to make 
strategic use of the available evidence in police interviews in order to improve lie detection. 
SUE’s core element is to withhold some of the available evidence and to ask questions about 
this evidence, assuming that liars display more statement-evidence inconsistency than truth-
tellers. An interviewer relying on these cues should reach higher detection accuracy. In line 
with these assumptions, empirical evidence has shown that SUE increases classification 
accuracy to 85%.  That unconscious thought helps to attain accuracy rates approaching those 
achieved by strategies such as SUE does not question the latter’s merit, but highlights the 
critical advantage unconscious processing may grant in deception detection.  One interesting 
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and testable hypothesis may be that because the effects of SUE and unconscious thought are 
conceptualized as resulting from different processes, a combination of the two procedures 
may further increase detection accuracy. 
Concerning methodology, it should be noted that within each experiment, not just one, 
but a set of deceptive versus truthful accounts was used, thus reducing the possibility of bias 
in materials.  Moreover, across experiments, three different types of stimuli were used that 
displayed different stimulus persons in different contexts with different content topics.  The 
results were found to be consistent within and across the five reported experiments, strongly 
attesting to the reliability and generalizability of the observed evidence.  Perhaps most 
importantly, with the methodology introduced in Experiment 5, the present contribution is one 
of the first to allow for conclusions about the processes occurring when individuals think 
unconsciously.  Here we showed that the methodology of identifying information cues, 
establishing cue validities, and testing how many and which of these cues are used across 
thinking modes allows for identifying why unconscious processes result in superior deception 
detection.  We believe that this methodology may generally propel research and discussion 
about unconscious processes, which to date has often been silent about what exactly 
contributes to performance advantages of unconscious processing. Moreover, this 
methodology may help to objectify the sometimes heated debate in the literature. Together, 
Experiments 3 to 5 decisively add to the literature of unconscious thought by showing that 
unconscious thought is superior to online judgment formation (and hence cannot be equated to 
it, see Lassiter et al., 2009), that what happens during conditions of unconscious-thought is 
different from merely being distracted without processing goal, and that the superiority of 
unconscious thought can be explained by reliance on more, and more valid cues of 
information.  
Going beyond methodology, the present results not only offer conclusions about why 
unconscious processing may be advantageous in deception detection, but also proffer an 
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intriguing speculation: Given the superior performance of unconscious-thought participants, it 
would seem that evolution did not fail to equip the human mind with an apparatus able to 
distinguish between truth and deception (as seemingly evident in the hereto witnessed close to 
chance level in deception detection, e.g., Hartwig & Bond, 2011), and that this apparatus 
resides in previously overlooked thinking modes.  This speculation converges with Hartwig 
and Bond’s (2011, p. 655) assertions that “intuition outperforms explicit notions about 
deception” and “that deception judgments are largely driven by intuitions that may be 
inaccessible to the conscious mind.”  These lines of thought may also help to resolve the 
apparent contradiction between the importance of accurate lie detection, for instance, for trust 
to develop, and the seeming incapability of humans to detect lies from the truth (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2004).  The key is that previous research has mainly investigated detection 
accuracy with situations best characterized as “conscious thinking,” which, however, is likely 
inapt to handle the particularly demanding challenges for correct lie detection.  Based on the 
reported evidence, we argue that individuals are adept at distinguishing lies from the truth, but 
what may be needed is that individuals place more faith in unconscious processes. 
Interestingly, the superiority of unconscious processing is said to stem at least partly from 
“naturally” appropriate weighing (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), and is thus a function 
of prior learning experiences and evolved associative network structures.  To the extent that 
the weighing schemes become more accurate with more learning experiences, at least two 
interesting and testable conclusions ensue: First, those who repeatedly receive feedback about 
whether their lie/truth judgments were accurate should show particularly impressive detection 
performance after periods of unconscious thought.  This conclusion highlights the importance 
of giving feedback to those being professionally occupied with deception detection 
performance.  Second, one may speculate that the superiority of unconscious thought is more 
pronounced with older than with younger individuals, thus adding to the literature 
highlighting the particular capacity of older individuals, instead of focusing on the cognitive 
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deficiencies related to physiological declines associated with aging (for a comprehensive 
review of age-related differences in cognition, see Salthouse, 2012). 
With regard to practical implications, it is likely impossible to think unconsciously when 
decisions need to be made quickly.  However, time permitting, the present results suggest that 
in the absence of conscious focus, unconscious processes may allow for higher classification 
accuracy because less stereotypical and more objectively valid deception cues are relied on.  
Judgments formed immediately or after periods of conscious thought, in contrast, seem to be 
hampered by reliance on stereotypical cues.  These differences in information use are worth 
highlighting again because it is precisely such systematic (conscious) evaluations of 
stereotypical deception cues that have been recommended, for example, in police training 
manuals (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Herrero, 2008; Meissner & 
Kassin, 2002; Sporer, 2004).  Against the background of the present results, caution with 
respect to such recommendations appears in order. In contrast, one might speculate how 
unconscious processes might be incorporated into manuals accordingly.  Very cautiously, we 
wish to close by inviting further research into the following three-step practical procedure: 
First, individuals should be asked to process the information of a given message with the 
explicit aim to form an overall impression only.  That individuals in applied settings often 
seek to detect deception right away may render this goal more difficult, yet not impossible, to 
attain.  For instance, instructions may stress that the general picture is important, much like 
when individuals are successfully asked to focus on global instead of local aspects (see, for 
instance, Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010; Marguc, 
Förster, & Van Kleef, 2011); or individuals may be asked to focus on something other than 
the focal person upon first exposure. Note that this first step appears conceptually 
commendable, but may not be imperative, as the results of Experiment 3 demonstrate, in 
which unconscious-thought participants performed well above chance despite likely 
wondering about truth status during information presentation. In a second step, individuals 
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should be made aware of the possibility of deception, or, if this is obvious in the respective 
area, only then be given the explicit goal to detect deception (consistent with Bos et al., 2008).  
However, following this instruction, it is important that conscious attention is drawn 
elsewhere.  Recommendations may include, for instance, focusing on another task, such as 
replying to emails or making a phone call.  At present, it is an open question as to how long 
this period of distraction should last, as distraction duration varies in the literature (see Strick 
et al., 2011).  What can be said, however, is that periods of two to three minutes proved 
successful in the present experiments.  Only then, in a third step, should individuals be asked 
to form veracity judgments. Again, in closing, we wish to stress that this three-step-model is 
not yet fit for a “roll-out” in applied settings, but is meant to provide pathways and testable 
hypotheses, propelling further research into ways of improving deception detection.  
In sum, the present findings offer a solution to the apparent puzzle of humans’ seeming 
incapacity to distinguish lies from the truth and the critical need of being able to do so. Five 
experiments not only document that conditions of unconscious thought help individuals to 
attain higher accuracy rates in deception detection, but also shed some light on the processes 
underlying this performance boost.  
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 Although participant gender was not of theoretical interest in the present line of 
experiments, earlier research has speculated about potential gender effects in the ability to 
detect deception (cf. Aamodt & Custer, 2006). To document the absence of such gender 
effects, participant gender was included as a control variable. In all experiments, analyses 
without gender as control variable yield similar significance levels.   
2 We also ran an analysis with set of messages as an additional independent variable. 
No significant main effect of set of messages or significant interaction effects with set of 
messages on d’ were found, all ps > .074. The same analysis with C as dependent variable 
yielded, unexpectedly, a significant 2-way interaction of thinking mode × set of messages, 
F(2, 54) = 3.89, p = .026. Moreover, a significant 3-way interaction of thinking mode × 
gender of participants × set of messages on C, F(2, 54) = 3.24, p = .047, was observed. 
Because of very low cell sizes in some of the conditions (n = 3), we refrain from suggesting 
interpretations.  All other ps > .19.  Full results are available from the authors.  
3 An analysis with set of messages as an additional independent variable yielded, 
unexpectedly, a significant main effect of set of messages on d’, F(3, 92) = 9.18, p < .001, ηp2 
= .23 (Mset1 = .19, SD = 0.75 vs. Mset2 = .10, SD = 0.84 vs. Mset3 = .91, SD = 0.79 vs. Mset4 = -
.14, SD = 0.70), suggesting that accuracy detection was higher in some sets than in others. 
Although unfortunate, this main effect appears negligible, because no interaction effects 
involving set of messages were observed, all ps > .21.  The same analysis with C as dependent 
variable yielded no significant effects, all ps > .11. 
4 We decided to label this group “immediate” so as to allow for easier comparison 
with the literature on unconscious thought, which generally features the three conditions 
unconscious, conscious, and immediate (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). 
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5 An analysis with set of messages as an additional independent variable yielded no 
significant main effect of set of messages or interaction effects on d’, all ps > .40.  The same 
analysis with C as dependent variable unexpectedly yielded a significant main effect of set of 
messages, F(4, 72) = 3.64, p = .009, ηp2 = .17 (Mset1 = .40, SD = 0.19 vs. Mset2 = .41, SD = 
0.16 vs. Mset3 = .25, SD = 0.26 vs. Mset4 = .28, SD = 0.21 vs. Mset5 = .27, SD = 0.18).  This main 
effect suggests that truth bias was more prevalent in some sets than in others.  Although 
unfortunate, this main effect appears negligible because no significant interaction effects 
involving set of messages were observed, all ps > .17. 
6 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this possibility. 
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Table 1 
Means (in %) and Standard Deviations of Accuracy of Lie/Truth Judgments as a Function of Thinking Mode in Experiments 1 to 4; 
Percentage of Participants correctly Classifying the Recording as True/False in Experiment 5. 
Experiment Thinking mode Lies Truths Overall 
  M SD n M SD n M SD n 
1 Standard control 53.41% 19.36 22 46.59% 25.93 22 50.00% 14.94 22 
 Conscious-thought 46.87% 18.52 24 57.29% 20.16 24 52.08% 15.05 24 
 Unconscious-thought 66.25% 23.33 20 60.00% 26.16 20 63.13% 20.47 20 
 Mean 54.92% 21.58 66 54.55% 24.38 66 54.74% 17.51 66 
2 Standard control 50.61% 27.66 41 54.27% 22.98 41 51.52% 17.94 41 
 Conscious-thought 50.68% 24.64 37 59.46% 28.47 37 54.39% 19.81 37 
 Unconscious-thought 68.42% 28.88 38 65.79% 23.55 38 65.46% 21.24 38 
 Mean 56.47% 28.19 116 59.70% 25.28 116 57.00% 20.41 116 
3 Standard control 35.41% 31.21 24 50.00% 29.49 24 42.71% 22.70 24 
 Conscious-thought 35.41% 34.51 24 54.17% 35.86 24 44.79% 31.26 24 
 Unconscious-thought 70.83% 35.86 24 72.92% 29.41 24 71.88% 30.67 24 
 Immediate 39.58% 36.05 24 41.67% 38.07 24 40.63% 34.43 24 
 Online 50.00% 32.67 24 58.33% 35.09 24 54.17% 30.98 24 
4 Standard control 44.55% 22.56 23 57.61% 15.87 24 51.09% 13.54 24 
 Conscious-thought 42.06% 19.50 22 50.00% 21.82 22 46.02% 16.54 22 
 Unconscious-thought 66.67% 26.61 21 63.10% 25.76 21 64.88% 22.92 21 
 Mere-distraction 47.06% 23.18 17 58.82% 19.64 17 52.94% 17.42 17 
 Mean 50.00% 24.69 83 57.23% 21.22 83 53.62% 18.88 83 
5 Standard control 66.67% na 36 30.56% na 36 48.61% na 72 
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 Conscious-thought 50.00% na 36 41.67% na 36 45.83% na 72 
 Unconscious-thought 61.11% na 36 94.44% na 36 77.78% na 72 
 Mean 59.26% na 108 55.56% na 108 57.41% na 216 
Note: na = not applicable in Experiment 5. 
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Table 2 
Columns 2 to 4: Point-Biserial Correlations Between Lie/Truth Judgments (rpb) and 
Occurrence of Verbal Content, Nonverbal, and Paraverbal Cues to Deception for standard 
control (sc, n = 72), conscious-thought (ct, n = 72) and unconscious-thought participants (ut, 
n = 72) in Experiment 5. Column 5 and 6: Relation Between Objective Truth Status and 
Occurrence of Verbal Content, Nonverbal, and Paraverbal Cues to Deception, expressed as 
Point-Biserial Correlations (rpb) and Effect Sizes (d); Column 7: Inter-coder Reliabilities for 
Objective Cues (r). 
 Subjective Objective Reliability
 sc ct ut    
 rpb rpb rpb rpb d r 
 Verbal Cues 
Number of Words .15 .11 -.12 -.10 -0.19 / 
Consistency -.21 .30* -.07 -.10 -0.21 .52 
Details (frequency) .19 .02 -.14 -.12 -0.24 .87 
Details (time) -.12 .11 .04 -.02 -0.03 .50 
Details (profoundness) .15 -.10 -.07 -.12 -0.24 .66 
Mental status -.01 -.08 .15 .25 0.50* .88 
Admitted lack of memory -.17 .12 -.04 .05 0.10 .89 
 Nonverbal Cues 
Nervous -.06 .04 .02 -.09 -0.18 .64 
Smiling -.07 .17 .14 .06 0.12 .93 
Eye contact .28* -.07 .02 -.02 0.03 .98 
Postural shifts -.14 .09 -.25* -.26 -0.55* .72 
Foot/leg movements -.05 .01 .01 .02 0.04 .86 
Hand/finger movements -.09 -.05 .07 -.03 -0.06 .96 
Chin raise -.05 .04 .01 -.02 -0.03 .86 
Involved/expressive -.29* .20 .10 .02 0.04 .69 
Attractiveness -.18 .28* -.05 -.03 0.06  .69 
Cooperativeness .02 .08 .02 -.10 -0.20 .65 
Friendly/pleasant -.12 .01 .18 -.07 -0.13 .62 
Facial pleasantness -.06 .01 .24* .31 0.64* .86 
Fidgeting .04 -.11 .26* -.02 -0.05 .83 
 Paraverbal Cues 
Response length .13 .21 -.10 -.10 -0.19 .99 
Verbal/vocal uncertainty -.06 .23 .11 .16 0.33 .59 
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Vocal pleasantness -.05 -.01 -.02 .05 0.10 .87 
Vocal tension -.07 -.06 -.30* -.27 -0.55* .96 
Unfilled pauses length .12 -.01 -.25* -.26 -0.55* .68 
Filled pauses length .17 .02 -.12 -.28 -0.59* .50 
Word/Phrase repetitions .04 -.01 -.18 -.24 -0.49* .89 
Note. Larger values of d indicate more frequent occurrence of cues in true messages. 
* p < .05; ** p < .005; *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Figure 1.  Classification accuracy (d’) as a function of thinking mode in Experiment 1.  Error 
bars indicate standard error of mean (SEM).   
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Figure 2.  Classification accuracy (d’) as a function of thinking mode in Experiment 2.  Error 
bars indicate standard error of mean (SEM).   
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Figure 3.  Classification accuracy (d’) as a function of thinking mode in Experiment 3.  Error 
bars indicate standard error of mean (SEM).   
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Figure 4.  Classification accuracy (d’) as a function of  thinking mode in Experiment 4.  Error 
bars indicate standard error of mean (SEM).   
 
 
